I am not sure who wrote this but I found it interesting.  It was sitting on my hard drive.   However it provides a good overview of the Middle East conflict and issues with applying mediation.  I believe if mediation was taught to every family member, the larger scale conflicts would de-escalate quickly as parties would be educated in problem solving and acknowledgement of differing perceptions.  Today the dominant paradigm is a power over paradigm where parties seek power over others rather than power within (self knowledge).  Thus they seek to win.  In mediation the aim is a win/win for both but always there is a trading off which is due to sharing.  It is not about the winner takes all.  In the future we will realise that what we see in another is a reflection of ourselves.  Moreover, when the other wins we win, when we win the other wins.  The intention will come from a desire for a win/win.

How effective is international mediation resolving the middle east peace process?

This paper will discuss the theoretical approach to international mediation and illustrate the practice of international mediation in respect of successful mediation exemplified by the Israel/Egyptian peace agreements and unsuccessful mediation in respect of the Israel/PLO mediation experiences.

International Mediation

The world environment is witnessing more outbreaks of violence and war and access to new weaponry.  Millions of  people are feeling the effects of hostilities, starvation, displacement through the effects of war.  Moreover, increasing environmental pressures are likely to generate more conflicts and emphasise the need to solve problems using methods that are peaceful and equitable.   Therefore international conflict resolution and dispute settlement are critical to survival. [i]

The international system is essentially anarchical with no world governance or rules of the game.  Power is diffused unequally between countries and sovereignty is guarded.[ii]   Countries are unwilling to subject themselves to international law or limits on sovereignty imposed by a supranational order.   Increased interdependence and an inability to resolve disputes themselves provide conditions where states will accept third party dispute settlement as objective criterium that is not binding.[iii]

The United Nations Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States addresses dispute settlement and threats to peace in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.   Article 33 indicates that when a dispute arises which endangers international peace and security parties are required to seek a solution through negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other arrangements.  Mediation in particular is referred to as facilitation and aims to scaling down hostilities.[iv]

Bercovitch asserts that international mediation is a form of conflict management where disputants seek or accept help from a third party (individual, group, state) to settle or resolve differences without deferring to violence.[v]  Conflict management is divided into two categories:  1) legalistic-normative procedures (adjudication, arbitration) and 2) voluntary procedures (mediation, conciliation).    The behaviour of states acting in their own self interest is not amenable to negotiation therefore mediation is considered an attractive alternative.[vi]   Mediation is as common as conflict and the most common method of third party intervention.[vii]  Mediation is viewed as assisted negotiation given it is an extension of bilateral bargaining and negotiation[viii]

International mediation is primarily used in conflicts that are long and drawn out, where there is an impasse, rising costs of escalation and an intention to break the stalemate.   The acceptance of mediation signals it is a matter of international concern.    The motivation to seek mediation includes factors such as:  negotiability of the issue, ripe moments, critical turning points, creatively reframing the problem, power symmetry, favourable assessments in prenegotiation phase.    Influential factors are:  awareness of historic moment, willingness to negotiate, risk takers, practical politicians, ideology suspended, goals limited, ignore underlying emotional issues, powerful incentives and catalytic.[ix]    Thus, parties are more willing to make concessions and are typically in a weaker position and mediation can provide an honourable escape route (cease-fire).[x]   In the case of India and Pakistan both were at a stalemate because they had insufficient power to impose a solution.    The political costs of rejecting mediation by a powerful mediator can motivate parties to mediation.[xi]    

The situations were mediation is not used or limited concerns situations where governments believe they will win or are in a strong position they are less inclined to make concessions.  Other situations are deemed ‘no compromise’ situations e.g. soviet union and hungry in 1956. [xii]  Mediation will not occur if the parties refuse to deal with one another, do not officially recognise (non-recognition) each other.  Moreover, if the positions are far apart, or there is disagreement about the agenda of if legal remedies are preferred.[xiii]  In cases where mediation is used to negotiate provisional/partial solution rather than a permanent settlement, thus getting to the root of the problem.  Moreover, when mediation takes place too early, e.g. before a battle before parties are ripe or ready to seriously explore settlement. [xiv]

Intervention of third party mediation at the appropriate time is referred to as the ripeness indicator.   Lieberfield identifies key indicators as:

• Stalemate, each credibly able to negotiate from a position of strength;
• Centrality in national-level political competition;
• Leadership change on side defending status quo;
• Failed attempts to cultivate alternative negotiating partners;
• Unofficial contacts between influential constituents;
• Leaderships specifying non-maximalist preconditions;
• Stable negotiated settlements in related conflicts.[xv]

The attractiveness of mediation as an alternative dispute resolution method includes:  informal, flexibility, inexpensive, not enforceable, reconcile claims, dyadic relationships,  and the potential to transform behaviour. [xvi]  

International mediators can be selected from a range of sources such as: the United Nations (UN), Presidents, ambassadors, non-government organisations (NG0s), churches or academics. It is important that the mediator is intelligent and able to grasp the issues, has energy and patience with a sense of humour.  The mediator must be seen as even-handedness and impartial.  The latter attribute is considered not as important in international mediation as having resources which are used to compensate parties and exert leverage in the mediation process.  However, impartiality is an important personal attribute to inspire trust and confidence in the mediator and the process.  Mediation by superpowers in the form of high level officials or presidents is likely to be more successful than medium or small powers. [xvii] The mediator’s task is to offer a solution to ensure both sides gain satisfaction.[xviii]    The mediator facilitates discussions, obtains information, provides suggestions, identifies issues, explores aims and a range of solutions and move parties towards agreement.[xix]

The mediator’s strategy of intervention ranges on a continuum from passive to highly active participation.  The mediator at the low end can engage in a passive role, as a channel, exercising minimal control over interactions (conciliation-facilitation).  The mediator controls aspects of the process such as the environment and agenda (procedural) or uses directive strategies to affect the negotiations, using influence, suggestions, pressure and manipulation.   The mediator apply strategies in differing degrees depending on the situation (substantive) and lastly overseeing the agreement (supervisory).   Bercovitch asserts that the more active the strategies, the more effective the outcome.[xx]  The type of intervention will be determined by the context of the dispute.  No strategies can be transferred directly to other situations given the complexity of international reality.[xxi]  In addition the contingency approach asserts that outcomes are contingent on dynamic context and process variables and challenges parties to develop and adapt objective and subjective strategies from a range of options.  Moreover, there is no agreed upon typology classifying alternatives.  Interventions will depend on the mix (conciliation, mediation, mediation with muscle, arbitration, consultation , peackeeping) and at which stage.[xxii]

The context of the situation can have an impact on the effectiveness of mediation.   Factors such as whether the regime is a single party (authoritarian) or multi-party (democratic), the latter is typically amenable to mediation.  The relative power between parties is an important factor, parties that are relatively equal in power and both weak are more suitable to mediation.    A history of friendship and cooperation can create more amenable mediation.  The duration of the dispute and the timing of intervention is important.  The longer the dispute, the more complex and less amenable to mediation.  The intensity of conflict is amenable to mediation in some situations where the intensity of the conflict predisposes a party to cut losses.  Conversely, the intensity can generates higher losses and thus polarise parties.  However Bercovitch states lower intensity conflict is more amenable to mediation.  The issues of the dispute are complex and underlying issues are not easy to identify, there may be more than one issue or the parties are unclear what the disputed issues are.  Issues can be over sovereignty, ideology, security and independence.   Disputes over territory, security are generally more amenable to mediation than ideology and independence.  However, issues concerning honour substantially reduce the effectiveness of mediation[xxiii]

Summary background of the Middle East Conflict

The roots of the territorial dispute in the middle east between Arabs and Israeli’s can be traced to middle of the second millennium BC.  The invasion of Canaan (Palestine) by the Israelites under Joshua (successor of moses).   The creation of Israel is based on the seeds sown on the back of self interest by Napoleon in 1798.  He beaconded the jews to return, he sought to re-populate the Holy Land to close secondary routes through Palestine and have the people in his debt. The British 40 years later wanted indirect control over Palestine and in the 1890’s there was anti-semitism building in Europe and the notion of  jewish nation state pushed by Theodor Herzl (founder of Zionism) and later announced by the British in the Balfour Declaration in 1917. [xxiv]  The British ruled the Palestine Protectorate between the world wars under the League of Nations mandate and on 14^th May 1948 the mandate ended and the State of Israel was created by a UN partition plan.  Arabs were opposed to the creation of the state and war broke out immediately.  In excess of 600,000 palestinians fled and became refugees.   The Gaza Strip and the West Bank were later annexed by Israel in the 1967 six day war.[xxv]   There were 5 Arab-Israeli wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1968-70, 1973) with the states of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and numerous cease-fires, disengagement agreements, armistice agreements, peace treaties, conferences, UN resolutions, declarations of principles, summits and until the present day the middle east has not reached a permanent resolution.[xxvi]

The arab public had opposed to contact with Israel for 30 years and top level contact was unthinkable post 1948.  The Arabs refused to recognise Israel and Israel refused to acknowledge the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)[xxvii].  Thus mediation was not possible until the period of the Camp David accords (Israel, Egypt, USA) in 1973-1978.  The Camp David accords were considered a monument of hope and which formed the basis of all peace efforts.[xxviii]

Successful Mediation – Kissenger 1973-1976

The mediation activities of US secretary of State Henry Kissenger during 1973-76 fostered conditions that created new normative order which constrained conflict.  Mediation was found to embed conflict with new kinds of behaviour and therefore is considered successful international mediation.

The Sinai I Agreement Sadat and Rabin exhibited the most commitment (ripeness) to mediation and a reliance on the process.  Israel was in a situation where there was a fragile ceasefire, economic issues, pyschological costs of mobilisation and strong incentive to produce disengagement, reduce military costs and block Arab demands for a complete withdrawal from the occupied territories.  The Egyptians were very receptive to US mediation, anxious to reap benefits of military gains, circumvent negotiations in Geneva and maintain Egypt’s position of leadership in the Arab world.[xxix]

To build commitment for mediation, the process followed a move to pragmatism and an agreement signed by Egypt and Israel in November 1973 to observe UN ceasefire, commence negotiations, disengagement and separation of forces.  The negotiations focussed on a broader withdrawal of forces, adopting conflict management and US mediation, bilateral conflict reduction initiatives, focus on functional and technical military matters in the absence of political-diplomatic relations.   This created a building of commitment to mediation. 

Pressing for agreement was a strategy within a context where both parties were anxious to conclude an agreement.    Sadat’s position was that Israel relinquish Miltla and Gidi passes, reduce troop levels on east bank of Suiz canal, reject restrictions on armaments in zones and once Israel withdrew from canal zone, Israeli cargo could pass.   As mediator Kissenger shuttled between Israel and Egypt.  He clarified demands, he sought to define limits that would be acceptable to Egypt and where Israel had no right to demand arms reduction of a sovereign state within its territory.   He then secured a formal disengagement plan and presented it to Egypt.   Kissenger reconciled Egypts demand for sovereignty with Israel’s need for security.  He educated Sadat on the limits to Israeli concessions.  Sadat was aware that rejection of the plan would create a protracted negotiations and undermine Egypt’s interests in the US-Egypt relationship.  This highlights the power of the US mediator.  Thus in the negotiation issues of principle were not discussed but quantitative limits on forces.  Sinai I was signed on in January 1974.

The parties learned the benefits of triadic negotiations in the disengagement agreement, Israel gave assurance of demobilising forces.  For Israel the agreement was with the most important state in Arab world, US credibility increased, relations strengthened, oil embargo likely to be removed.  Kissenger reinforced the importance of progess within a realistic time frame.

The limits of learning featured in 1975.  Neither party was willing to be more flexible, Israel sealed deadlock refusing to redefine issues of non-belligerency.  The mediator had made errors of miscalculation, tactical and judgement leading to a failure of negotiations.

Reinforcing new learning and returning to original game.   Kissenger departed due to deadlock.  Separate discussion with President Ford, Kissenger, Rabin to quit passes, and pledge for non-belligerency.  In response to US pressure Israeli officials developed new plan in July 1975.  Options to solve problems were produced.  Thus a narrowing of differences between parties was achieved.  Kissenger continued shuttling between the two sides.  His taks was to create a new Israeli line, US aid, verification arrangements in the Sinai.  Kissenger began formalisng terms of agreement.  Issue of passes resolved.  Kissenger produced details to remove obstacles to negotiation.  A new agreemetn was signed in September 1975.

Parties experienced normative changes through a number of stages.  In stage 1 the best alternative to a negotiated agreement would be war.  There was an absence of trust.  In stage II mediated negotiations contineud, a shift was the commitment to mediation and agreement on importance of disengagement.  At significant juncture was Kissengers ability to apply leverage to induce behaviour change by convincing the Israeli’s of Sadats inability to make substantial concessions in relation to force limitations and sovereingty.  Kissenger used a deliberate strategy of pressing to reduce non-agreement alternatives.  He controlled the agenda, created a sense of urgency regarding absence of credible alternatives, and established a zone of agreement, redefining issues that did not threaten.

The Sinai I agreement was safeguarded through US assurances of compensation through military and financial assistance and commitments to monitor the new agreement.  The norms fostered were 1) reciprocity 2) functional cooperation 3) mediated negotiation.  Thus under the guidance of the mediator new rules and procedures were initiated.  In respect of reciprocity parties learned that willingness to engage in the process had payoffs.  The success was keeping issues of political accommodation out of mediation and parties learned that limited cooperation could co-exist with adversarial relations.

Kissenger exploited parties continued dependence on the US.  He adjusted mutual expectations of behaviour.  Norms became internalised in the Sinai II agreement given the costs of the deadlock and BATNA of war.    Moreover, he created a new zone of agreement, redefined key issues, adapted strategy of pressing and compensation and focussed on technical problems rather than sovereignty issues.  He shifted from triadic bargaining (Sinai I) negotiation to direct bargaining with Israel and altered compensation to increase attractiveness.  He shifted from seeking concessions to providing guarantees.  Israel was convinced of less binding language in relation to non-beligerency, coupled with massive US aid.

Kissenger accomplished the 4 objectives of 1) geneating new learning by altering preference structures through pressing, compensation and integration strategies 2) fostered repetitive behaviour, new behaviour, new expectations, extend possibilities for conflict management 3) rewarded new learning through compensation 4) compelled parties to make public that war would not constitute permissible behaviour.  Thus it became a visible process, backsliding less attractive, informal partner-specific rules.    Kissenger created a structure of conflict management at Camp David in 1978.[xxx]

Kissenger’s approach is clearly interventionist and manipulative where the ends justify the means.  Bercovitch considers manipulation the most effective mediation.[xxxi]

Negotiation with the PLO

The refusal of the Arab states to recognise Israel and its refusal to acknowledge the PLO blocked direct negotiations.[xxxii]   Major  obstacles was the status of the PLO as villains.  Villains can be created and provides cohesion of in-group strength.  Dehumanisng or demonising the enemy provide strong psychological motives as part of power strategy to gain advantage[xxxiii]   However, the 1978 peace treaty with Egypt provided a psychological breakthrough and was a precedent applied to agreement with the PLO.[xxxiv]

Five perceptual and political shifts led to direct negotiation between Israel and the PLO.   The first shift was an acknowledgement of permanence.  Both Palestinian  and Israeli leaders realised the permanence of the adversary.  The second shift was influenced by an eroded bargaining position.  Arab states and the Soviet Union were no longer supporting.  In addition more land seizures on the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.  In relation to the Israeli’s the post 1967 boundaries not acceptable in light of the intifada uprising and acknowledgement of the price of occupation.  Both parties were losing support in the absence of settlement.  PLO was concerned about deteriorating conditions in Gaza that may cause the PLO to lose control.  Rabin had promised a settlement in his 1992 campaign.  The third shift the PLO set out less than maximal positions, both reassured no threat to nations existence.  Prospects improved by unofficial contacts.  Shift four – changes in leadership from ideologically opposed Shamir to pragmatic Rabin.  Shift five no alternative negotiating partner to the PLO.

The hurting stalemate reveals the ripeness and an acknowledgement that coercion failed and status quo was perceived as not tenable.  Palestinians changed their idea that they are no longer weak but not strong enough to destroy Israel.  In 1988 the Palestinians shifted their view that the peace formula’s were not surrender but meant victory because of their initiative.  The imbalance of power in Israel’s favour combined with military strength and need to contain the intifada.  Political situation and shared interests produced ripeness.  In addition the US influence over the Israeli elections in 1992 brought Labour to power due to US loan guarantees, a central issue for immigrant Soviet jews.[xxxv]

An incremental process began in 1993, the Oslo Accords, 1995 interim accords, 1997 Hebron agreement, 1988 Wye memorandum.[xxxvi]   However the inconsistent peace process has undermined faith in the process.  Attempts by the international community and parties have failed to stop the violence.  Israeli’s today lives in fear of Hamas suicide bombers and the Palestinians live in poor conditions in fear of military offensives by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF).   

Why have mediated negotiations failed

The conflict is society-wide and not just between government or representatives.  Demonisation of the enemy and massive human rights abuses against civilians.[xxxvii] The process where people need to be empowered to forgive, heal and bring stability into their lives is not addressed in government mediation.[xxxviii] 

George Irani points out that peace treaties based on economics and politics are not permanent.  Must explore underlying issues such as: fear, hatred, sorrow, mistrust, victimisation and vengeance.[xxxix]

David Baharvar argues that conflicts rooted in lack of communication which create warped perceptions e.g. language and cultural differences.  In Hebrew and Arabic words for reconciliation do not coincide.  For Arabs peace does not entail reconciliation, in Hebrew peace is friendship and reconciliation.  For Arabs failure to stop tensions results in revenge to restore honour.  In arabic adl justice and haqq truth and right are very important, compromise is perceived as not a virtue.  There are deep disparities with words loaded with different meanings.[xl]

The US role is perceived as a combination of mediation and arbitration.  The US is not an impartial or neutral mediator given its provision of arms and funding to Israel.[xli]  The US provides 40% of all US foreign aid to Israel approximately 3.5 billion annually.[xlii]  Hence 75% military aid to Israel is used to purchase from arms from US suppliers.[xliii] Hence, the motivation behind international mediation is not peace oriented, it is geo-strategic, self interested, manipulative activity which does not provide long-term conflict resolution.[xliv]

Fisher and Ury Getting to Yes[xlv] discuss the different structured approaches to negotiation.  The above discussion has depicted features of hard bargaining, hence demanding concessions, distrust, initial positions unchanged (withdrawal occupied territories, cessation of violence), trying to win a contest of wills and applying pressure (US mediation).   Principled negotiation is the preferred technique given its focus on interests and problem solving.  According to George Irani interest-based negotiation focuses on people’s long term interests, not the short run and avoids hard or soft bargaining.[xlvi]   There has not been a separation of people from the problem.  The Israeli’s and Palestinians have demonised each other.  Negotiations have focussed on positions not underlying interests.  This is highlighted in the UN handbook describing mediation as facilitation to reduce scale down hostilities and the mediator understanding positions.[xlvii]   Exploring interests rather than positions.  Israel’s interests are to preserve the jewish culture, demographic majority, security, safety, links to Jewish holy sites, national symbols and an end to conflict.  The positions are:  Jerusalem as capital, link to Temple Mount, maintain borders, incorporate settlers, Jordan Valley as eastern security boader.  The palestinian interests are: living in freedom, dignity, equality, security, ending occupation, national self-determination, controlling holy sites in Jerusalem.  Thus their position is:  Palestinian statehood, sovereignty, pre-67 borders, refugees crisis resolved, areas where ancestors lived prior to 1948, Jerusalem as capital and security guarantees.

The endless cycle of negotiations creates apathy and disrespect for the signed agreements, not packaged as a final agreement.  Factors such as:  the power imbalance, negotiations enhancing disagreements creates diminishing negative returns given final settlement hasn’t been concluded.[xlviii]